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Abstract—System assurance is confronted by significant chal-
lenges. Some of these are new, for example, autonomous
systems with major functions driven by machine learning
and AI, and ultra-rapid system development, while others
are the familiar, persistent issues of the need for efficient,
effective and timely assurance. Traditional assurance is seen as
a brake on innovation and often costly and time consuming.
We therefore propose a modernized framework, “Assurance
2.0,” as an enabler that supports innovation and continuous
incremental assurance. Perhaps unexpectedly, it does so by
making assurance more rigorous, with increased focus on the
reasoning and evidence employed, and explicit identification of
defeaters and counterevidence.
1. Introduction
Assurance is often seen as a drag on innovation and as
an activity that is additional to (and generally comes after)
the “real work” of design and implementation. We instead
propose that assurance can be an enabler for innovation and
a constructive element in a holistic design process. However,
if assurance is employed from the early stages of design,
it will necessarily be incomplete at those stages, so we
need some measures to indicate if we are headed in the
“right direction” and to help prioritize issues and solutions.
Counterintuitively, perhaps, we propose that the way to
address these and other concerns that we will introduce later,
is by making assurance more rigorous, in a framework that
we call “Assurance 2.0.”
This framework aims to support reasoning and com-
munication about the behavior and trustworthiness of engi-
neered systems and, ultimately, their certification. It builds
on the notion of an “Assurance Case,” where claims about
the system are justified by an argument based on evidence.
In particular, it maintains a representation of the structure of
the argument as a tree of claims linked by argument steps
and supported by evidence (e.g., Figure 7) as in ASCAD
CAE [1] and GSN [2]1, but strengthens it with increased
focus on the evidence and the reasoning (both logical and
probabilistic) employed, and on exploration and assessment
1. We use a variant on CAE terminology: we say claim where GSN
says goal, we say argument step where CAE says simply argument (and
GSN says strategy) and we use argument for the whole tree of claims and
argument steps. Our diagrams use the CAE style.
of doubts and “defeaters.” We introduce the ideas in this
section, and give details (and references) in subsequent ones.
In current practice, steps in an assurance argument are
often inductive,2 meaning the subclaims strongly support
the parent claim, but do not ensure it, as a deductive
step would. In Assurance 2.0 we advocate that argument
steps should be deductive, and this can require additional
evidence. For example, argument steps often iterate over
some enumeration (e.g., over components, or over hazards)
and for this to be deductive we need evidence that the
enumeration is complete and that the claim distributes over
its elements. In cases where it seems impossible to provide
a deductive step, the “gap” must be acknowledged and given
special attention. To support these recommendations, we
advocate use of pre-analyzed argument templates such as
CAE Blocks [3], which provide mechanisms for separating
inductive and deductive lines of reasoning, and for managing
the side conditions necessary to justify deductive steps and
excuse inductive ones. This insistence that reasoning steps
should be “as deductive as possible and inductive only as
strictly necessary” is one of the ways in which Assurance
2.0 strengthens traditional assurance; deductive reasoning
steps ensure that doubts have nowhere to hide and thereby
help identify weak spots and focus attention in productive
directions.
Arguments are grounded on evidence and we advocate
explicit assessment of the “weight” of evidence offered in
support of a claim. It is not enough for evidence to support
a claim; it must also discriminate between a claim and
its negation or counterclaim. We recommend interpreting
“weight” using ideas and measures from Confirmation The-
ory, which do exactly this. Again, this aspect of Assurance
2.0 is more demanding than traditional estimates for the
strength of evidence and requires explicit consideration of
counterclaims. Claims supported by sufficient weight of evi-
dence may be used as premises in a logical interpretation of
the overall assurance argument and when, in addition, all the
reasoning steps are deductive, we have a deductive thread
from facts, established by evidence, to the top level claim
and thereby satisfy a benchmark for informal reasoning
known as Natural Language Deductivism (NLD).
2. This is an unfortunate choice of words as the same term is used with
several other meanings in mathematics and logic.
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Although it is primarily motivated by practical consid-
erations and by experience with current methods, the As-
surance 2.0 framework aligns with modern developments in
epistemology (notably, confirmation theory and NLD), and
we strengthen this alignment through use of “indefeasibility”
as the criterion for justified belief (e.g., that an assurance
case establishes its claim). For a belief to be justified,
the Indefeasibility Criterion requires that we must be so
sure that all doubts and objections have been attended to
that there is no (or, more realistically, we cannot imagine
any) new information that would cause us to change our
evaluation.
Doubts and objections are exemplified as defeaters so the
indefeasibility criterion applied to assurance cases requires
a comprehensive search for defeaters to the argument. Once
a potential defeater has been identified, it must itself be
defeated, meaning that more detailed analysis shows that it is
not, in fact, a defeater, or that the system and/or its assurance
case are adjusted to negate it. In Assurance 2.0, we advocate
that the search for defeaters, and their own defeat, should be
systematized and documented as essential parts of the case
(just as hazard analysis and the hazard log are essential parts
of safety engineering). One systematic approach is through
construction and dialectical consideration of counterclaims
and countercases. Counterclaims arise naturally in confir-
mation measures and are discussed in Section 2.1, while a
countercase is an assurance case for the negation of the top
claim and is discussed in Section 3.2.2.
Confirmation bias—the tendency to interpret information
in a way that confirms or strengthens our prior beliefs—is a
natural hazard in assurance cases—after all, we are engaged
in building a case to support the system. Competent and
diligent external reviewers are good defenses against con-
firmation bias, but are typically involved only periodically
and mostly toward the end of the development of a case.
Several of the innovations in Assurance 2.0 are intended to
provide systematic mitigations against confirmation bias at
every step in the development of a case without the excessive
conservatism that leads to prolix cases with unnecessary
evidence presented “just in case,” or even to the rejection
of good systems.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes
the basic structure of an assurance case argument and the
criteria for evaluating its soundness. Section 3 discusses con-
fidence in the case and Section 4 provides brief conclusions.
2. Arguments, Step by Step
A key innovation in the development of modern as-
surance cases was the idea of a “structured safety case,”
introduced in the 1970s, that required an argument to explain
how the design of the system and the checks and tests
performed during its development combine to ensure safety.
Subsequent refinements in the 1990s led to the idea that
the argument itself should be structured, that is, organized
around goals or claims, and grounded on evidence about
the system. Methods and notations such as Goal Structuring
Notation (GSN) [2] and Claims, Argument, Evidence (CAE)
[1] emerged at this time and support a body of expertise and
practice that thrives to this day.
The general structure of an assurance case argument is
illustrated in later diagrams, such as Figure 7. An argument
is organized as a tree of two kinds of basic steps: evidential
(at the leaves) and reasoning (interior), which are described
in the following subsections. Mixed forms are also possible.
2.1. Elementary Evidential Steps
Let us begin with the most basic kind of argument step:
one where some item of evidence directly supports a claim.
To make things concrete, we will suppose our examples
are taken from a case in which random tests are used to
support a claim of reliability (certain nuclear cases are like
this [4]). One step in the argument for this case will concern
soundness of the test oracle: that is, soundness of the means
by which we judge the correctness of test outcomes. Figure
1 portrays this step: at the top is the (sub)claim that the
oracle is sound (which will be backed by a description of
what it means for an oracle to be sound); at the bottom is a
description of the evidence for its soundness (which will be
backed by reference to files containing the actual evidence),
and in between is an argument that the evidence does indeed
guarantee the claim; we say that this argument is one for
evidence incorporation and we refer to the whole argument
step (i.e., claim, argument, and evidence) as an evidential
step.
Figure 1. Elementary Evidential Step
Implicit in the previous sentence is the idea that claims
and subclaims are logical propositions: that is, statements
about the “world” (by which we mean the system of interest
and its environment) that may be true or false. Evidence,
on the other hand, is a description or pointer to some
observation or experiment on the world. An argument for
evidence incorporation documents a human assessment that
the evidence persuasively attests the truth of the claim.
This assessment may be informal, or it may employ
some systematic process. In the latter case, it is usual to
talk of weighing the evidence and of accepting the claim
when the weight of its supporting evidence crosses some
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threshold. This raises the question of how weighing is per-
formed and what units are employed. A standard treatment
uses probabilities: if e is some evidence then P (e) is the
probability of seeing this evidence. Although it is possible
to construct frequentist interpretations for this quantity, it is
generally interpreted as a subjective probability, that is, a
human judgment of likelihood expressed numerically from
0 (impossible) to 1 (certain). Similarly P (c) is the subjective
probability that the claim c is true. We might consider
this the “background” or prior probability, which is then
“boosted” by the evidence e to the posterior probability
P (c | e). Thus, P (c | e) > t for some t might be considered
a suitable criterion for accepting c on the basis of e.
Let us suppose that the evidence for soundness of our or-
acle is that it was extensively validated against the previous
version of the system. This seems like fairly strong evidence
so we might make the qualitative assessment that P (c | e)
is “high.” However, a critic might say that if the evidence
is about a previous version of the system, how relevant
can it be to soundness of the oracle for this version? A
sharp and general version of this question asks whether the
evidence can discriminate between a claim and its negation,
or counterclaim. This suggests the weight of evidence should
not be based on P (c | e) alone, but should also consider the
difference between this value and P (¬ c | e). Difference can
be measured as a ratio, or as arithmetic difference.
An attractive variant turns these conditional probabilities
around: instead of the posterior probability of the claim
P (c | e), we consider the likelihood of the evidence given
the claim, P (e | c), and compare this to its likelihood given
the counterclaim, P (e | ¬ c). Likelihood and posterior prob-
ability are related by Bayes’ rule and so the choice of one
over the other might seem moot. However, it is often easier
to estimate the likelihood of concrete observations, given
a claim about the world, than vice-versa (i.e., it is easier
to estimate a likelihood than a posterior). Furthermore, the
likelihood P (e | c) has a more “causal” flavor—we think of
(the property underlying) the claim causing the evidence
rather than vice-versa.
These ideas, and the general topics of evaluating and
measuring “weight of evidence,” date back to the World War
II codebreaking work of Turing and Good [5], where Good’s
original measure for weight of evidence was log P (e | c)P (e | ¬ c) .
Today, these topics are studied in Bayesian Confirmation
Theory (a subfield of Bayesian Epistemology [6]) and many
confirmation (i.e., weight) measures have been proposed [7].
Among these, that of Kemeny and Oppenheim is popular:
P (e | c)− P (e | ¬ c)
P (e | c) + P (e | ¬ c) .
This measure is positive for strong evidence, near zero for
weak evidence, and negative for counterevidence.
Returning to our example, we need to estimate the
likelihood of the evidence about the oracle (i.e., it exhibited
good performance against a previous version of the system),
given a) the claim that the oracle is sound, and b) the
counterclaim that it is not. An oracle evaluates tests and their
outcomes against requirements, so we need to ask whether
the requirements have changed between the previous and
current versions of the system. Let us suppose the answer is
“yes, a little.” It’s good that we asked, for the proffered
evidence tells us nothing about the performance of the
oracle against those requirements that have changed since
the previous system—unless we know more about the oracle
structure and the modularity of the requirements. Without
further evidence about the nature of the requirements and
the oracle, the Kemeny-Oppenheim measure is zero and we
conclude that the proffered evidence is of no value.
Although in most cases we do not advocate assessment
of numerical valuations for confirmation measures, nor their
constituent probabilities, we believe that informal consider-
ation as was done here (and “qualitative” assessments such
as small, medium, and large) can provide significant benefits
in the evaluation of evidence.
What are these benefits? There are just a couple of ways
in which an assurance case can be flawed or, as we say,
defeated [8]. One is that the evidence supporting a claim is
inadequate to justify the confidence required; philosophers
call this undercutting defeat. It could be that the evidence is
merely insufficient (e.g., we did testing, but not enough of
it) or it could be that there is a gap or flaw (e.g, the case just
considered of an oracle evaluated against a previous version
of the system). Confirmation measures, even when assessed
informally, provide rational quantification for the weight of
evidence and thereby guard against undercutting defeat.
The other kind of defeat is when there is evidence
that contradicts a claim; this is called a rebutting defeater.
Confirmation measures require consideration of the extent
to which evidence supports counterclaims, and thereby force
a search for rebutting defeaters within evidential steps.
Defeaters for an assurance case are rather like hazards
for a critical system, and just as the search for hazards is
an essential element in the engineering of critical systems,
so the search for defeaters is an essential element in the
evaluation of assurance cases. Confirmation measures are
an attractive tool in this search as they identify both kinds
of defeat in evidential steps and thereby provide a valuable
and necessary antidote to confirmation bias, which some
consider an endemic vulnerability in assurance cases [9].
This section considered only elementary evidential steps;
a less elementary step may incorporate several items of
evidence in support of a single claim. The overall confi-
dence measure may then involve conditional probabilities
and likelihoods for evidential items that are not independent
of each other. Tools for Bayesian Belief Nets (BBNs) can
assist in construction and evaluation of numeric models for
these circumstances. Although we do not advocate numer-
ical assessments for the probabilities involved, “what if”
experiments with a range of possibilities can prove very
enlightening. An example is given in [10].
2.2. Elementary Reasoning Steps
We have considered an elementary evidential argument
step—one where we assess the extent to which evidence
supports a claim—and now turn to a similarly elementary
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reasoning step—one where several (sub)claims combine to
support a parent claim. Figure 2 illustrates such a step.
Here we suppose we have three subclaims concerning a
test procedure, each supported by evidence or an entire
subargument (these are not shown): one asserts that the test
oracle is sound (as in the previous section), another that the
test procedure is sound, and the third that the tested software
is the actual software. The step asserts that if these three
subclaims are true, then we may conclude that the overall
test process is sound. Each of these claims will be backed
by a description of what it means and bound together by an
argument that the subclaims “lead to” the parent claim.
Figure 2. Elementary Reasoning Step
We say the subclaims “lead to” the parent because we
have not yet established the relationship that is intended.
In some early interpretations for an assurance case, the
intended relationship was structural rather than logical: it
simply indicated that the case for the parent claim decom-
posed into subcases for each of the three subclaims. In
modern interpretations, the intended relationship is logical
but it may be deductive (i.e., the subclaims imply or entail
the parent claim) or inductive (i.e., the subclaims “suggest”
the parent claim). In text presentations, an annotation on the
central argument box can indicate which of these is intended.
When a deductive interpretation is indicated, the argu-
ment must make the case that the subclaims truly entail the
parent claim. Sometimes a convincing case can be made
with no additional information, but often an additional sub-
claim will be needed to substantiate the case. Logically, this
additional subclaim is just like the others and conjoins with
them to entail the parent claim; however, it is contextually
somewhat different, so we call it a “side condition” or “side
claim” and draw it in a different position and color (but same
shape), as shown in Figure 3. In this case, we are claiming
the three conditions considered in the original subclaims are
the only threats to overall soundness of the testing process
and the side condition, which asserts this, will need to be
supported by evidence akin to hazard analysis to justify it.
Observe that some elements that may appear in claims
(e.g., xy ) may not “make sense” unless another (assumption)
claim (e.g., y 6= 0) is true. Since all the subclaims in an
argument must be true if we are to conclude its top claim,
we could allow each subclaim to be interpreted under the
Figure 3. Reasoning Step with Side Condition
assumption that all other subclaims are true. However, it can
require additional analysis to ensure there is no circularity
in this reasoning, so a useful compromise is to impose some
standard order of evaluation.
In Assurance 2.0, we advocate that all reasoning steps
eventually should be deductive as this raises the bar on
the quality of argumentation required, and is necessary to
satisfy the indefeasibility criterion for justified belief in
the overall argument. However, the precision and rigor we
advocate needs to be reconciled with the need for concise
communication and constructive progress during system
development. Thus, we accept that argument steps may be
inductive during the early stages of system development and
assurance exploration. But it is desirable that tools should
assist in keeping track of these transitional compromises.
A workaround for tools based on deductivism would be to
supply inductive steps with a nugatory “something missing
here” side claim that is asserted to make the step deductive,
but is unsupported by evidence. This allows progress, while
the unsupported side claim acts as a constant reminder of
the imperfection in this argument step.
The energetic search for defeaters is a rational guard
against hubris and confirmation bias in the construction of
assurance cases. For reasoning steps, a systematic organiza-
tion of the search can be based on challenges to their de-
ductiveness, which goes hand-in-hand with (re)formulation
of their side conditions: strengthening a side condition, and
its supporting evidence, is one way to defeat a successful
defeater of this type.
This section considered only elementary reasoning steps:
those where a claim is supported by subclaims. In less
elementary reasoning steps, a claim may be supported by
a combination of subclaims and evidence. The most use-
ful construction of this kind is best interpreted not as a
reasoning step, but as an evidential step with side claims
that function as assumptions. Reference [11] provides more
discussion of these topics.
3. Soundness and Confidence Assessment
In Assurance 2.0, the interpretation that we apply to an
assurance case is a systematic instance of “Natural Language
Deductivism” (NLD) [12], which regards its informal argu-
ment as an approximation to a deductively valid proof. NLD
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differs from proof in formal mathematics and logic in that
its premises are “reasonable or plausible” rather than certain,
and hence its conclusions are likewise reasonable or plau-
sible rather than certain. Our requirements that evidential
steps cross some threshold for credibility (e.g., as assessed
by a confirmation measure), and that a thorough search for
defeaters persuades stakeholders that the case is indefeasible
and all reasoning steps are deductive, systematizes what it
means for the premises to be “reasonable or plausible” and
thereby give us confidence that the overall argument is sound
and the top claim is true. But then we might ask, how much
confidence, and how much do we need?
Some assurance cases may be more persuasive than
others, and not all (sub)systems need the highest levels
of assurance: indeed, several standards speak of “Safety
Integrity Levels” (SILs) from 1 (low) to 4 (high). Thus,
we need ways to assess confidence in a case, and principled
ways to organize cases so that the lower SILs are easier and
cheaper to achieve. The confidence we need depends on the
nature of the claim and the decision being made. In some
cases (we call them “quantitative”), the claim may include a
numeric estimate for some parameter (e.g., reliability) and
our confidence then reflects epistemic uncertainty in this
quantity. In others (we call them “qualitative”), the claim
may be that the system has no faults, and our confidence
in this claim (sometimes called “probability of perfection”
[13]) can be used to estimate long run survival without
critical failures [14].
3.1. Qualitative Cases
A natural measure for confidence in the claim of an
evidential step is P (c | e); as explained in Section 2.1, we
do not use this as a measure for the weight of evidence
because that must also account for the ability of the evidence
to discriminate between the claim and a counterclaim, but
once the evidence has been accepted on the basis of its
weight, it is reasonable to use P (c | e) as our confidence in
its claim.
Next, we need a method to “combine” the confidence
measures from the evidentially supported subclaims of a
reasoning step to yield a confidence measure for its parent
claim, and so on to the top of the tree where we obtain
a confidence measure for the top claim. Probability and
logic build on completely different foundations and their
combination is difficult. Graydon and Holloway [15] ex-
amined 12 proposals for using probabilistic methods to
quantify confidence in assurance case arguments: 5 based on
Bayesian Belief Networks (BBNs), 5 based on Dempster-
Shafer or similar forms of evidential reasoning, and 2 using
other methods. By perturbing the original authors’ own
examples, they showed that all the proposed methods can
deliver implausible results.
However, in Assurance 2.0 we have a very simple special
case. Ideally, all our reasoning steps are deductive conjunc-
tive implications (i.e., definite clauses), so confidence in a
parent claim is given by the product of confidence in the
subclaims (provided they are independent). Iterating this
over the whole argument tree, confidence in the top claim is
the product of confidence in all the evidentially supported
claims. If we have reasoning steps that are not deductive,
then it is sound (though often highly conservative) to cal-
culate doubt (i.e., 1 - confidence) in the parent claim as no
worse than the sum of doubts of the subclaims [16].
Confidence in individual claims may itself be expressed
qualitatively (e.g., “high,” “medium,” “low”) and so it will
be necessary to develop plausible rules for the “product”
of such estimates (e.g., the product of 15 to 25 “highs”
yields “medium”). Adjusting a case, or a case template, for
different SILs can be accomplished by weakening claims,
and by reducing the quantity or quality of evidence de-
manded; this may in turn allow some subclaims and their
supporting argument to be eliminated: e.g., if we replace
static analysis by human inspection, we no longer need a
subcase for soundness of the static analyzer (but we will
need a subcase for reviewer efficacy). Subclaims should not
otherwise be removed, for that necessarily makes the case
inductive, but we could reduce the threshold at which minor
caveats and defeaters are considered mitigated.
In the early stages of system development, the assurance
case may be very incomplete yet we would still like to get
guidance on areas where attention should be focused. One
possibility is to assign exaggeratedly precise assessments for
projected confidence in various subclaims (e.g., 73% for this
one and 91% for that, and 3% for a nugatory side claim)
and then “run the numbers” and do “what if” exercises to
learn where the largest impacts reside. The tools supporting
these calculations could also take challenges and defeaters
into account: a subclaim that has not been challenged would
have its confidence reduced, and undefeated defeaters would
do the same.
3.2. Quantitative Cases
Next, we consider an example where confidence is an
explicit part of the top claim. In addition to confidence, this
example also illustrates a more complex development, where
defeaters and counterclaims play an important part.
The example is a case based on statistical testing, as used
in certain nuclear applications. The idea is that random tests
(that follow the “operational profile”) can justify a reliability
claim, such as probability of failure on demand (pfd) [4].
The evidence offered is a report of the tests performed.
The analyst reviews this and integrates it into an assurance
case justifying a claim for a certain pfd x that is held
with confidence c1, based on what the analyst considers to
be a well known theory of statistical testing. This initial
assurance case is shown in Figure 4, where the top claim is
a predicate that could be used in a larger case, such as one
that combines reasoning about reliability with evidence for
correctness.
However, on reflection, the analyst decides that this
initial case is subject to significant doubts, because the
argument for evidence incorporation does not reach the
threshold for indefeasibility: for example, can we be sure the
theory of statistical testing was applied correctly? In a fully
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Figure 4. Initial Case for Statistical Testing, with Doubt Annotation
tool-supported environment, there would be ways to indicate
this potential defeater but, for the text-based description used
here, the analyst simply marks the claim as one with doubts.
The root problem is that the evidence incorporation step
combines both the extraction of facts from the test report,
and their analysis and interpretation with respect to a model
of statistical testing.
Figure 5. Separation of Facts from Test Report and Inference of Reliability
Consequently, in Figure 5 these two aspects are sep-
arated: evidence incorporation extracts the purported facts,
and a reasoning step provides the argument that these justify
the top claim, with a side claim (that will eventually need to
be justified by evidence) to support the validity and correct
application of the statistical testing and reliability model.
In constructing a justification for the reasoning step,
consideration of this side claim will force realization that
the supporting claim “Passed N tests” needs to have a more
precise interpretation: namely, that the tests demonstrated N
failure-free demands in succession, and that no other failures
were observed. Thus, this claim should be changed to “N
successive failure-free demands and no other failures.” If the
lower, evidential step can support this claim (as opposed to a
weaker claim where some failures may have been observed)
then we can retain Figure 5 as our assurance case, but with
the claim “Passed N tests” replaced by the more precise
form, as shown in Figure 6.
Figure 6. More Precise Claims
Consideration of the side claim also forces realization
that confidence in the top claim is with respect to aleatoric
uncertainty3 (based on the extent of testing) and this is
reflected in the revised top claim where Ca replaces C1.4
Consideration of indefeasibility and side claims sug-
gested improvements in the case; we now look at defeaters.
3.2.1. Defeaters. Further reflection, or challenging peer
review, might ask how do we know that the tests were
performed correctly, and that issues such as correctness of
the test oracle were addressed appropriately? The analyst
recognizes that these are legitimate defeaters and the case
needs to be strengthened by including a subcase similar to
that previously illustrated in Figure 3.
One approach would be to construct a new assurance
case in which Figure 6 is a subcase dealing with reliability
and confidence, and an elaborated version of Figure 3 is a
subcase dealing with soundness of the overall test procedure.
A slight variant, which is appropriate because the top
claim explicitly states the confidence associated with the
pfd x, is to interpret Figure 6 as a subcase dealing with
aleatoric uncertainty and an elaborated Figure 3 as a subcase
dealing with epistemic uncertainties. This approach is shown
in Figure 7. Note that this and subsequent examples are not
complete cases: some claims lack supporting evidence.
3. Aleatoric (or aleatory) uncertainty is uncertainty in the world: if I toss
a fair coin 100 times, the number of heads is subject to aleatoric uncertainty;
epistemic uncertainty is uncertainty about the world: if I give you a coin
and invite you to toss it 100 times, there is additional uncertainty about
the number of heads because you do not know if the coin is fair or not.
4. C1 and Ca are numbers, but they are annotated with descriptions of
their interpretation and it is these that change.
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Figure 7. Showing Defeaters Have Been Incorporated
Figure 7 provides a pattern in which we separate rea-
soning about aleatoric doubts (left-hand leg) from that about
epistemic doubts (right-hand leg). However, we may some-
times need to reason about aleatoric and epistemic aspects
within the same framework, as when we wish to model their
interactions and dependencies. If we were able to provide a
quantified judgment of our confidence in the soundness of
the oracle and the test process in the form of conditional
probability distributions, then we could combine them in a
BBN model that does this, as illustrated in Figure 8.
Figure 8. Incorporating BBN Modeling
Here, the left-hand leg uses Bayesian reasoning to pro-
vide a probability distribution for the property of interest,
and from that derives a confidence figure in the claimed pfd
x. There is a new side claim that requires justification for
the application and validity of the BBN model. The right
hand leg deals with defeaters to the BBN approach; it has
identified two (represented as negated claims): validity of
elicitation of the probability distributions from experts, and
its repeatability. Furthermore, we have a side claim asserting
these are the only sources of doubt. We are not sure they are,
so this argument step is inductive; we choose to represent
this by adding a nugatory third “other doubts” claim.
These defeaters are formidable: it is seldom credible that
we can derive full conditional distributions as needed here. If
we can, then the benefit is that the confidence calculated by
the left hand leg may be much greater than can be supported
by weaker assumptions and conservative calculations as in
Section 3.1. An intermediate position in the tradeoff between
confidence in the claim and doubts about assumptions is to
reduce criticality of the claim and increase confidence in
its reduced form: if we are 90% confident that a subcase
establishes SIL3 then, with some additional modeling and
assumptions, we might become 99% confident that it is
better than SIL2, and this could be sufficient to argue that
it meets the evidential threshold. If challenged to deal with
the remaining doubt, we could use a chain of confidence
[17] that combines a firm judgment about the 99% with a
conservative judgment about the other 1%.
3.2.2. Countercases. Another way of identifying defeaters
or sources of doubt is to develop an explicit countercase
that aims to refute the claim under consideration. This task
could be assigned to a different team, which, given its differ-
ent viewpoint, might generate challenging and unexpected
defeaters for the base case. There is some tension here:
a totally independent countercase might have an argument
structure completely different to the base case, and thereby
generate irrelevant defeaters.
However, there seems to be a useful transformation from
case to a parallel countercase (and vice-versa): mitigated
defeaters become claims and claims become a source of
defeaters. Thus, the assurance case pattern in Figure 7 is
transformed into the countercase shown in Figure 9. (The
left and right hand legs are reversed because we draw claims
on the left and doubts on the right.)
4. Conclusion
We have described and illustrated Assurance 2.0, whose
purpose is to support the assurance challenges posed by
recent developments in system design and deployment, and
to provide a framework in which assurance can become an
enabler of innovation. Assurance 2.0 retains the structure of
Assurance Cases and can build on much recent and current
research and tooling. Where it differs is in stressing rigor
in assessment of the evidence and reasoning employed, and
a focus on challenges to confirmation bias through use of
confirmation measures, counterclaims and countercases.
Assurance cases have served traditional safety-critical
systems well [18], but we have observed them floundering
when confronted by radically new challenges such as au-
tonomous systems driven by machine learning and AI, by
applications with a security focus, and with new stakehold-
ers such as the AI community. Assurance 2.0 renews the
original focus of assurance by asking for a natural language
7
Figure 9. Systematically Derived Countercase
explanation why the proposed system satisfies the properties
claimed for it, while balancing this with systematic methods
for identifying defeaters. A completed Assurance 2.0 Case
attests to the relevance and strength of its evidence and
the deductive validity of its reasoning, and also records the
defeaters to which it has responded, thereby establishing not
merely its plausibility but its indefeasibility.
Ideas underlying Assurance 2.0 have been used with
some success in training several groups of engineers and
managers and applied in research projects with regulators
and industry. A significant element in successful deploy-
ment, only briefly mentioned here, is use of a small library
of “pre-validated” argument steps (called “blocks”) [3] that
reduce the bewildering choice in free-form arguments.
For the future, we hope to see application of these
ideas to significant modern systems, supported by training
across a wide range of disciplines and the development of
constructive tool support. The formal nature of the reasoning
and evidential analysis that underlies Assurance 2.0 should
enable productive interaction with tools for logical and prob-
abilistic reasoning and formal argumentation, together with
novel automation in the search for defeaters, the construction
of cases and countercases, and the management and repre-
sentation of dialectical examination. We plan to prototype
and evaluate the approach in industrial applications and
research projects including the DARPA ARCOS program.
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